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1.  Introduction 
 
Over the past half century, trade costs (broadly defined) have been steadily reduced 
through continual improvement in transportation and information technologies, 
together with the continuing efforts to lower institutional barriers in international 
trade, investment, and finance. The technological and institutional changes have been 
particularly remarkable in the last two decades, and have been significantly influenced 
by the diffusion of the internet and the formation of the network of free trade 
agreements. These factors have contributed to changes in the spatial configuration of 
the global economy, which have led to a sequence of structural changes that have 
evolved toward an increasingly complex system of the production network. 
East Asia has benefited from globalization without a doubt. Figure 1 shows that, 
since the turn of the century, East Asian exports of final goods (consumption and capital 
goods) to the rest of the world have expanded quite rapidly. Although the growth of final 
goods trade within East Asia has been relatively modest, regional integration has been 
driven mainly by the trade of parts and components that has increased in unison with 
the growth of final goods exports to the rest of the world. The expansion of East Asian 
extra-regional consumption goods exports can be largely attributable to China, whose 
share increased from 15% in 1990 to 59% in 2009; whereas China and ASEAN countries 
import respectively about 30% and 26% of intra-regional intermediate goods trade in 
2007-09. This graph illustrates East Asia as the global core of manufacturing, within 
which parts and components are intensely traded. Although Japan represented about a 
half of intra-regional intermediate goods exports in the beginning of 1990s, the share 
has declined to 22% in 2007-09 because of rapid growth of exports from Korea, Taiwan, 
ASEAN and China.   
There are uncountable numbers of studies on East Asian integration. Kojima (2000) 
presents a comprehensive review of the standard “flying geese” paradigm of Asian 
development based on the international division of labor. It describes the diffusion of 
industrialization in the region as following a pattern whereby leading countries such as 
Japan progressively specialize in technologically advanced industries while ceding 
those in which they were losing comparative advantage to countries that were 
latecomers in industrialization. That paradigm has been challenged, however, by the 
ongoing processes of the international fragmentation of production (Kimura and Ando 
2005; Athukorala and Yamashita 2006), offshoring of labor intensive activities 
(Wakasugi et al. 2008), and globalization of supply chain (Fujita and Thisse 2006), 
which are leading to intra-industry vertical specialization.  2 
 
This paper has two objectives. First is to provide the logic of interpreting the 
current wave of regional integration in East Asia from the perspective of spatial 
economics, or the new economic geography, by illustrating how agglomeration and 
dispersion forces interact. Second is to contribute to the literature of spatial economics 
by adding natural disaster risks as a source of dispersion forces, particularly when 
production is vertically linked and there exists a threat that any disruption at a critical 
node will hinder the entire supply chain. In this regard, we draw certain lessons from 
the experience of the Great East Japan Earthquake on March 11, 2011. 
The next section provides a brief review of agglomeration and dispersion forces in 
spatial economic theory. In section three, drawing on our previous study (Fujita and 
Hamaguchi 2010), we explain how current East Asian integration is characterized by 
intra-industry vertical specialization. Under this structure, Japan provides advanced 
intermediate goods to developing Asian countries, where more labor-intensive activities 
are conducted. However, that role may not be sustainable in the long run, particularly 
when supply chain disruption risk from high impact natural disasters is conceivable. 
We address this issue in section four. The final section discusses certain implications for 
regional policies in Japan that, in our view, faces a more serious threat from 
deindustrialization after the great earthquake. 
 
2.    Agglomeration forces and dispersion forces 
 
Spatial economics provides a useful framework to analyze the dynamic transformation 
of spatial economic systems by cutting across traditional boundaries of cities, regions, 
and countries. The observed spatial configuration of economic activities is understood to 
be the outcome of a process involving agglomeration forces and dispersion forces. As a 
balance of these two forces, a variety of spatial structures of an economy may emerge. 
Thus, spatial economics focus on the self-organization of economic geography, as 
opposed to many fields in economics that treat it as exogenously given.   
From this perspective, the fundamental questions are how to explain agglomeration 
forces and dispersion forces. The latter can be readily answered by traditional economic 
theory. The concentration of economic activities at a location will naturally increase 
factor prices (such as land prices and nominal wages) and generate congestion effects 
(such as traffic congestion and air pollution), which reduce firms’ profit and residents’ 
utility level. Thus, the principal concern of spatial economics is how to explain 
agglomeration forces. Broadly speaking, the idea proposed by Fujita, Krugman, and 
Venables (1999) is shared by many researchers: that is, agglomeration results from the  3 
 
interaction among increasing returns at the individual firm-level, transport costs 
(broadly defined), and factor mobility.   
Fujita (2007) describes three basic concrete patterns of such interactions. First, we 
can consider a large variety of consumer goods. In response to scale economies, the 
production of such goods tends to locate in larger markets (= cities). As a result of lower 
transport costs, people can consume at lower prices in cities, where, for a given nominal 
wage, real income becomes higher than that in more distant places. This, in turn, 
induces more workers (= consumers) to migrate to cities. Subsequently, as the cities’ 
population increases, their home markets are magnified, enabling an even larger 
variety of consumer goods to be produced in cities, which will further enhance real 
income.  
Second, we can consider a large variety of intermediate inputs. Because of the scale 
economies, suppliers of such goods tend to locate in areas where final goods firms (= 
customers) are concentrated. On the other hand, it is convenient for final goods firms to 
locate near input suppliers as much as possible to avoid transport costs. This, in turn, 
induces more final goods firms to move to such locations. As a result, great demand is 
created for diverse intermediate and producer services, prompting more firms to locate 
there because of easy access to their customers and increasing diversity in intermediate 
goods; hence, the agglomeration proceeds with a snowball effect. The process of 
co-agglomeration of input suppliers and final goods firms through this interaction 
partially explains not only the industrial cities specialized in machinery production and 
characterized by multilayered vertical integration but also modern metropolises 
crowded with corporate headquarters, research and education institutions, and 
specialized business services.   
Third, focusing on the diversity of knowledge among workers, we can observe the 
agglomeration of brain-powered workers and innovation activity in today’s major cities. 
Due to the fixed costs involved in acquiring certain types of knowledge, brain-powered 
workers are attracted to working in collaboration with those with complementary 
knowledge; creating opportunities for each brain-powered worker to utilize his/her own 
knowledge to a greater extent. Because knowledge exchanges call for face-to-face 
communication, these workers tend to agglomerate. Furthermore, better access to more 
diversified knowledge provides higher productivity in innovation activities, which 
induces more innovation activities/institutions to locate closer to larger pools of 
brain-powered workers. The resulting increase in innovation activities creates demand 
for an even greater variety of brain-powered workers. 
On the basis of the aforementioned understanding of agglomeration and dispersion  4 
 
forces, Fujita, Krugman, and Venables (1999) showed that transport costs play a key 
role in determining the spatial system of an economy. It is noteworthy to recognize that 
transport costs refer to many different types of costs that are involved in the movement 
of goods, services, people, money and capital, as well as information, knowledge and 
technology. With regard to the international trade of goods, we must consider, in 
addition to the usual freight costs, many other forms of trade costs such as tariff and 
non-tariff barriers, exchange rate variation, and costs arising from different languages 
and cultures, many of which are often difficult to quantify.   
We may exemplify an extreme case in which transport costs are prohibitively high. 
Producers of differentiated consumer products, intermediate inputs, and those with 
differentiated knowledge have no choice but to disperse themselves in proportion to 
local demands arising from the immobility of certain factors (due to the existence of 
activities attached to the land or delimited by national borders, for example), giving 
away cost savings from scale economies. Now, consider that transport costs decrease 
gradually. Then, at a certain period of time, the circular causation in spatial 
agglomeration starts working. The lower are transport costs, the smaller is the number 
of agglomerations and the bigger is the size of each agglomeration. As remarked by 
Fujita and Thisse (2002, p.129), “the trade-off between increasing returns and 
transportation costs is fundamental for the operation of a spatial economy.” With a 
further reduction in transport costs, however, the aforementioned dispersion forces 
come to light. That is, as the reduction of transport costs gives rise to the formation of 
the large agglomeration of economic activities, prices of land and labor become higher 
and congestions are exacerbated. In response, those activities that use labor or land 
intensively start moving to peripheral places to achieve cost reductions without 
seriously losing scale economies because distance is an irrelevant obstacle for sales 
under substantially low transport costs. 
In addition to the role of transport costs, the existence of lock-in effects influence 
spatial economics. These effects arise from the self-reinforcing mechanism of 
agglomeration that induces individual economic agents to avoid changing location, even 
though such deviation is possible in the presence of multiple equilibria of spatial 
patterns. Lock-in effects have the following implications. First, they show that history 
matters in the development of a particular region. That is, historical incidences give 
influence to actual industrial location patterns. In the presence of the aforementioned 
self-reinforcing mechanisms, any temporary shock may have a permanent effect on 
industrial location patterns. Second, while lock-in effects can promote a snowballing 
acceleration of agglomeration in a particular region in its early stage of development, it  5 
 
may demobilize a saturated situation, thus, hampering sustained development in the 
long run. We may observe the latter problematic case in certain traditional industrial 
cities suffering lower productivity due to high factor prices and congestion. In another 
instance, in case degradation of living conditions in a city prevents the inflow of fresh, 
brainpowered workers, while the incumbents are locked-in, the productivity of research 
and development in the city decreases because knowledge exchanges continue to be 
made only among the same members, leaving less room for learning among the workers 
(Berliant and Fujita 2008). In this context, regional development policies should be 
concerned with avoiding the trap of negative lock-in effects.     
 
3.    Regional integration in East Asia 
 
At the global level, while the traditional two economic cores—that is, Europe and North 
America—hold the leading positions, East Asia has emerged as the third core, assuming 
the role of the primary exporter of industrial products. Figure 2 shows that the world 
share of GDP of the three cores increased from 80% in 1990 to 94% in 2002, and then 
decreased to 75% in 2010, while we observed a catch-up in GDP in East Asia against 
that of the EU and NAFTA1. The three core economies claimed 82% of world exports in 
1990, with this share increasing to 85% in 1998 but then gradually declining to 76% in 
2010, while East Asia’s share continued to rise from 21% in 1990 to 30% in 20102. The 
increasing participation of non-core economies in both GDP and trade also reflects the 
growing presence of India and certain natural resource-based economies. 
It is also notable that there have been remarkable changes in economic balances 
within East Asia. Japan, the traditional regional core economy, has lost its weight in the 
region substantially between 1990 and 2010, when its influence fell from 71% to 37% of 
GDP and from 41% to 17% of exports. In contrast, China expanded its regional share 
from 9% to 40% of GDP and from 9% to 35% of exports, surpassing Japan as the 
regional leader. During the same period, the regional share of ASEAN’s GDP increased 
gradually from 8% to 12%, while that of exports, facing competition from China, first 
increased from 20% in 1990 to 26% in 1996 and then declined slightly to 23%. Korea and 
Taiwan maintained their regional shares of GDP and exports over the two decades. 
The rise of economies of China and ASEAN can be partially attributed to the 
growth of foreign direct investment (FDI) from Japan. Besides increased factor costs 
                                                  
1  These calculations are based on the GDP figures in current US dollars from the World 
Economic Outlook database of the IMF. 
2  Export figures are calculated from the WTO statistical database.  6 
 
and congestion caused by agglomeration in Japan, the appreciation of the yen against 
the dollar, occurring in several waves over the years (1990–95, 1999–2000, 2002–04, 
and 2007–11), has accentuated the production cost difference between Japan and 
developing Asian countries. In response, Japanese firms have launched 
internationalization efforts and dispersed production mainly within East Asia. 
According to the Basic Survey of Overseas Activities (Ministry of Economy, Trade and 
Industry), the number of Japanese overseas manufacturing affiliates in Asia (including 
South Asia in this case) has increased from 3,920 in 1997 to 6,154 in 2009 (representing 
a 57% increase, which is two times greater than the 28% growth in total global overseas 
affiliates). Over the same period, permanent employment in Japanese overseas 
manufacturing in Asia has almost doubled from 1.43 million to 2.82 million. In contrast, 
total employment in manufacturing in Japan declined by 2.83 million between 1997 and 
2007 (from 14.45 million to 11.62 million), according to the Labor Force Survey 
(Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications). 
In the process of internationalizing production, previously integrated production 
processes were split into several units on the basis of factor intensity differences; this 
optimization behavior results in the location choice of each unit in different countries, in 
accordance with the factor endowment of each country. Most typically, labor-intensive 
final assembly is located in low wage developing countries, while advanced intermediate 
goods are produced in industrialized countries. This trend known as fragmentation has 
been emphasized in empirical research on international trade in East Asia (Kimura and 
Ando 2005, Athukorala and Yamashita 2006).   
The vertical intra-industry specialization pattern between Japan and developing 
Asian countries is different from the traditional flying geese paradigm of an 
inter-industry division of labor. Under the latter, as depicted in Figure 3 (left), Japanese 
FDI transferred those industries that Japan no longer had a comparative advantage in 
to developing Asian countries, while Japan shifted its own production resources to more 
capital-intensive (or technology) industries. The specialization enhanced efficiency in 
both Japan and developing Asian countries, realizing significant scale economies that 
resulted in massive exports to outer markets (mainly Europe and North America) and 
paved the way to export-led high growth.   
Under the recent specialization pattern, depicted in Figure 3 (right), developing 
Asian countries’ exports of final products to global markets induce imports of 
intermediate goods from Japan as well as from Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore, leading 
to the expansion of intra-regional trade volume, as depicted in Figure 4. Dean et al. 
(2011) shows that although China’s export composition has become so diversified that it  7 
 
includes highly sophisticated products similar to that of OECD countries, more 
high-tech products tend to depend on an Asian supplier network, while Chinese 
industries are more vertically specialized in labor-intensive stages of production. As 
Athukorala and Yamashita (2006) point out, it is worth noting that despite growing 
intra-regional trade in East Asia, the region’s dependence on extra-regional markets in 
final goods demand has not been reduced but, on the contrary, has increased.   
From the perspective of spatial economics, the following comments are in order. 
First, fragmentation has been helped by the dispersion force of high costs in Japan and 
reductions in intermediate goods transport costs. In this process, final production did 
not disperse evenly across developing Asian countries but was concentrated in a limited 
number of locations that provided high market potential, where higher quality 
infrastructure contributed to the improvement of access to outer market consumers and 
to a reduction in the cost of receiving regionally supplied intermediate goods3.  
Second, dispersions of final production have been accelerated by local demand in 
developing Asian countries and resulting agglomeration forces based on scale economies. 
In these countries, relatively young and fast growing, middle income populations 
constitute the most vigorous consumer demand. For example, locations of foreign firms 
in China have been strongly influenced by local factors such as the existence of parts 
suppliers of the same countries of origin4, infrastructure, and human capital quality 
(Wakasugi 2005), which foster production cost advantages for exports to the outer 
region markets. However, as local demand turns out to be a more decisive factor in the 
market potential of an investment project, location decisions will be more influenced by 
access to the local population. In the case of China, in particular, firm locations will be 
more directed toward places inland from a coast because the Chinese population is 
spatially dispersed due to its migration control policy5. 
Third, Japan’s position as an intermediate goods provider may be uncertain. The 
existing agglomeration of critical parts as well as materials manufacturers and 
production machinery manufacturers is serving as the source of agglomeration forces 
that lock in entire advanced manufacturing industries in Japan. However, due to not 
                                                  
3  International production dispersion contributed to a reduction of income gaps among 
nations, while regional income disparities have become a serious concern in certain 
countries, particularly in China. See Hamaguchi and Zhao (2011). 
4  Belderbos and Carree (2002) and Depaere et al. (2010) studied the case of Japanese 
firms’ and Korean firms’ FDI locations, respectively. 
5  In 2009, Hewlett-Packard invested in Chongqing for the production of notebook PCs 
jointly with Foxconn’s LCD display factory. Recently, Honda announced the expansion of 
its automobile plant in Wuhan. The both investment are reportedly designed to capture 
the local demand in inland China.  8 
 
only the dispersion force from high factor costs in Japan but also growing scale 
economies in developing Asian countries, intermediate goods production may be induced 
to co-agglomerate with final goods production. The eventual loss of the accumulation of 
critical parts and materials manufacturers or production machinery manufacturers 
would significantly undermine the source of competitive advantage of Japan’s advanced 
manufacturing industries, marking a severe blow to a country that has already lost its 
competitive advantage in widespread technology-based mass production. Certainly, 
Japan’s innovative intermediate goods are highly differentiated such that many may 
not be produced without the agglomeration of brainpowered workers. However, as 
described in the previous section, the productivity of innovation depends on whether 
Japan will be able to maintain knowledge diversity. This will require attracting 
brainpowered workers internationally.   
 
4.    Supply chain disruption risk as another dispersion force 
 
On March 11, 2011, the most powerful earthquake ever recorded in Japan, with a 9.0 
magnitude, occurred off the coast of Miyagi prefecture in the Tohoku (Northeast) region. 
It triggered a destructive tsunami that hit an extensive area on the coast of the Tohoku 
and the northern Kanto regions (Figure 5). The 3/11 disaster resulted in more than 
15,000 human lives lost and almost 5,000 people remain missing, in addition to severe 
damage to physical infrastructure. It further prompted critical nuclear power plant 
accidents in Fukushima prefecture. Because of radioactive releases, about 90,000 local 
residents have been forced to evacuate from their native area for an indefinite period. 
The uncertainty of electric power supply may mark a severe blow to the manufacturing 
sector, whose competitiveness has already been weakened because of a strong yen in the 
last couple of years. 
The disaster has had an immediate impact on the Japanese economy. Although the 
Tohoku region represents only 6.4% of Japan’s GDP and just 1.0% of total exports in 
2008, the impact of the disaster appeared to be unexpectedly large. National GDP in the 
second quarter of 2011 plunged by 2.1% compared to the same period in the previous 
year, while industrial production and exports dropped even more sharply by 7.0% and 
8.0%, respectively. 
The magnitude of the economic impact is partially attributable to supply chain 
disruptions. The disaster-affected area serves as a major source of supply chain flows of 
goods (from the procurement of parts to the delivery of finished products) to support 
Japan’s manufacturing industry. Failures of parts and materials delivery from this area  9 
 
have forced many manufacturers—ranging from assembling manufacturers such as 
automobile and electric appliance makers to other parts and materials makers—across 
the country to suspend their operations as well. As shown in Table 1, more severe losses 
were experienced by the automobile industry (buses, passenger cars, motor vehicle 
parts, and trucks), the electronic equipment industry (household electronic machinery, 
communication equipment, other information and communication electronic equipment, 
and integrated circuits), and the metal industry (metal products for building, 
non-ferrous metal casting, and refining of non-ferrous metals). These industries 
particularly depended on key parts and basic materials produced in the 
disaster-affected area. Figure 6 reports that Japanese automobile production in March 
2011 was 57.3% less than that in the same month last year. However, if we assume that 
firms had produced normally until March 11th, the impact following the disaster could 
have been as large as the -85.7%6, implying that the automobile production in the 
remaining period of March was just about three days production level in the previous 
year. We can infer that immediately after the disruption, automobile producers with a 
just-in-time procurement policy (therefore basically no parts inventory) could produce 
cars only by scrambling up parts in production processes that lasted only three days. 
The impact was not limited to within Japan. For example, in places where 
Japanese automobile makers have a strong presence, intermediate goods shortages 
caused a sharp drop in automobile production with certain time lags, such as one month 
after the earthquake in Guangdong province of China and the next month in Thailand, 
as shown by Figure 6. It is notable that the speed of the contagion of shocks was slower 
in Thailand, which is farther from Japan. This is because firms tend to hold more of 
imported intermediate goods in safety stock in case of a sudden interruption in supply. 
The recovery was also slower in Thailand than in Guangdong because of time lags in the 
arrival of imported parts. 
Systemic problems may occur when a natural disaster destroys critical nodes in a 
supply chain wherein production of particular parts and components is concentrated 
within a few suppliers. Such concentrations are self-organized as we can explain using 
the same logic as for a spatial economy: i.e., low transaction costs and scale economies. 
Although Japanese automobile companies have sought to increase procurement from 
                                                  
66  Assuming that, as in February, the production by March 11 was 5.5% less than 
March 2010 (= 945,271 units), we consider that Japan produced by March 11 
945,271*(1-0.055)*11/31=316,971 units of vehicles that is 85.7% less than 
945,271*20/31. Subtracting this from the actual figure of March (=404,039), we obtain 
that 87,069 units were produced after the disaster, which corresponds to about 3 days 
production in 2010 March.  10 
 
multiple sources, it is not possible to fully control procurement concentration at lower 
tier suppliers. It is more likely that concentration occurs when scale economies matter, 
particularly if parts are so expressly customized that firms cannot place bulk orders. To 
further complicate matters, when the disruption occurred, it was impossible to find 
replacements from other suppliers, at least in the short run, because of a high degree of 
customization. A typical example in the 3/11 disaster was the Renesas Electronics’ Naka 
plant located in Ibaraki Prefecture. It produces a micro control unit (MCU) for high 
quality motor vehicles that makes extensive use of electronic control technology. Over 
the years, Renesas has become a supplier of customized MCU for major automobile 
companies in the world7. The shutdown of the plant caused a sharp drop in automobile 
production in Japan during the second quarter.   
If concentration increases the potential risk of disruption for the entire supply 
chain in the case of high impact/low probability events, we might find another case of 
dispersion forces. Dispersions in this case may involve: building safety stocks 
(dispersion of products); use of multiple suppliers; and duplication of production 
facilities. These actions aimed at increasing redundancy and resiliency are called 
business continuity plans (BCPs) and they receive great attention in the literature of 
supply chain management (see Sheffi and Rice Jr. 2005). 
However, individual firms are rarely capable of taking significant actions to 
mitigate the potential loss from the supply chain disruptions because they are generally 
reluctant to assume costs from the loss of scale economies. However, the 3/11 disaster 
was not the first supply chain crisis in East Asia. The significant earthquake in Taiwan 
in March 2000 shut down large liquid crystal display factories agglomerated around the 
Hsinchu Science Park. The outbreak of the SARS epidemic in southern China in 2002–
03 sent further ripples through the global supply chain. Japan itself also suffered 
disruptions after the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake of 1995 and the Chuetsu 
Offshore Earthquake in 2007. Yet, certain critical nodes still widely exist8. Most recently, 
in October 2011, Japanese manufacturing firms suffered serious supply chain 
disruption by Thailand’s worst flood in 50 years. Thailand has been one of main 
recipients of Japanese firms’ investment not only for the final assembly but also as a 
production base of intermediate goods particularly for the production of pickup trucks 
and hard-disk drives. 
Previous research has already pointed out why firms fail to incorporate the cost of 
                                                  
7  According to the Financial Times (April 1st, 2011), Renesas claims a 40% share of the 
world market for MCU used in cars. 
8  For example, almost 40% of DRAM production capacity in the world is concentrated in 
the surrounding regions of Seoul. We thank Ho-Yeon Kim for confirming this figure.  11 
 
high impact/low probability events. In the case of a low probability event, it is hard to 
learn from past experiences, potentially making our predictions more diverse and 
imprecise. Moreover, uncertainty will be high in decision making because the valuation 
of risks is difficult. Suppose that firms have heterogeneous beliefs about high 
impact/low probability events. Optimistic managers may consider that the probability is 
just once in one thousand years, while pessimistic managers assume that it would be 
once in one hundred years. While firms of the latter type consider that it is necessary to 
introduce BCP to implement a project, optimistic managers concentrate on production 
without hesitation. Scale economies and ignorance of BCP costs will make optimistic 
firms’ market power favorable; thus, market competition leads firms to seek the benefit 
of agglomeration without paying costs for preventive measures. This resembles Miller’s 
(1977) argument regarding the capital market consisting of agents with heterogeneous 
beliefs and restricted short selling. He found that in such a market equilibrium prices 
would only reflect the opinion of the more optimistic investor. 
The agency problem also might be an issue. A risk conscious buyer may wish to 
enforce a BCP on its supplier in the business contract, but the supplier’s 
implementation could be partial if monitoring costs are high. 
However, the impacts of the 3/11 disaster were large enough to reduce the 
heterogeneity in beliefs, encouraging more Japanese firms to establish backup plants in 
overseas locations, or permanently relocate their production from Japan to overseas. 
According to METI (2011), supplier firm managers perceive that foreign customers and 
Japanese firms already producing overseas seek to reduce dependence on intermediate 
goods imports from Japan, while final manufacturers in Japan make more serious 
efforts to procure from multiple sources, including overseas suppliers. Thus, the 3/11 
disaster came as a further blow to the Japanese manufacturing sector that was already 
threatened by high factor costs and a strong yen, although the lock-in effects of 
agglomeration economies from the intermediate goods variety had prevented a 
hollowing out.   
 
5.    Implications for post-3/11 disaster regional policies in Japan 
 
I n  t h i s  p a p e r ,  w e  h a v e  a r g u e d  t h a t  a gglomeration of critical intermediate goods 
supports lock-in effects that keep manufacturing industries located in Japan. The 
presence of advanced manufacturing industries in the Tohoku and northern Kanto 
regions has steadily increased since the mid-1990s as they have come to see greater 
advantage in locating their operations in these regions for a variety of reasons, which  12 
 
include: relatively cheap labor and land available in abundance; improved accessibility 
to the Tokyo metropolitan area owing to transportation infrastructure developments 
over the years; enhanced academic and research infrastructure led by Tohoku 
University; and the enthusiasm of local communities in supporting an industry in their 
region.  
The 3/11 disaster occurred when the region was just about to take a more important 
position in fulfilling Japan’s role as an advanced intermediate goods supplier to East 
Asia. The best possible strategy is apparently to return to the pre-disaster state as 
quickly as possible once plants and factories in the affected area are able to restore 
operations. However, only restoring the pre-disaster state is not necessarily enough to 
achieve the recovery of the local economy in a sustainable way. The Great 
Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake in 1995 caused disastrous damage to the Port of Kobe, 
which was locked in as one of the hubs of Asian container traffic. At the time of the 
earthquake, global ports were competing with mega facilities equipped with deep water 
berths, which other ports in East Asia such as Busan, Shanghai, and Kaohsiung were 
already equipped with, and thus had competitive advantage.  It turned out to be 
impossible for the Port of Kobe to recapture the leading position once lost just by 
rehabilitating the port to its original structure.   
Hence, analogical reasoning can be applied here. To prevent Japan’s manufacturing 
industries from falling into the same fate as the Port of Kobe, it is imperative to 
carefully analyze the current global competitive conditions and think beyond the 
restoration of the pre-disaster structure. Once Japanese manufacturers’ backup or 
substitute production in overseas locations gets into full motion and their overseas 
counterparts secure substitute suppliers, parts and materials suppliers in the Tohoku 
and northern Kanto regions will never be able to restore their product demand to the 
pre-disaster level, even if their plants and factories are rebuilt and restored to operation. 
The result would be the disappearance of jobs not only in the Tohoku and northern 
Kanto regions but all across Japan as well as a significant loss of agglomeration forces 
within the Japanese manufacturing sector as a whole. Moreover, failure in restoring 
manufacturing industries in the affected area could spell an ominous future for Japan. 
We consider that Japanese regional policies need to redraw strategies based on the 
current environment of East Asian integration that has developed in the last few 
decades. For the most part, knowledge-based activities centered in core metropolitan 
areas and the mass production conducted in the countryside have been closely linked 
within Japan to provide advanced industrial products, mainly intermediate goods, to 
the East Asian production network. However, manufacturing jobs in the countryside,  13 
 
such as those in the 3/11 disaster-affected area, have recently become at risk because of 
high factor costs, the strong yen, and the conceivability of a higher risk of natural 
disasters. If these manufacturing activities were to disappear, there is no reason to be 
confident that the knowledge-based activities in core metropolitan areas will still 
remain without the nearby manufacturing base. In order to enhance plant-level 
competitiveness in the countryside, we will be able to learn from the German 
experience9 in recovering labor productivity based on the ‘coordinated economy model’ 
where labor unions conceded the flexibilization of working conditions in exchange for 
guarantees of employment security and vocational training from employers with the 
approval of blockholder owners interested in long-term profit (Carlin and Soskice 2008). 
As in Germany, coordination was the hallmark of Japanese firms’ behavior (Aoki 1990), 
although it has been substituted for arm’s-length transactions under globalization. 
Increasing job securities will also contribute to boost domestic demand that will offset 
dispersion forces. 
Regional policies can address these problems at three levels. First, agglomeration 
economies among brain-powered workers can be strengthened by enhancing living 
amenities that attract diversified, talented people globally. Second, production costs 
should be reduced through tax reforms and deregulation. There is also an urgent need 
to reinsure global markets that the electric power supply system will be safe and 
sustainable after the Fukushima nuclear power plant collapse. Third, if there is 
systemic fragility in vertical integration because of the endogenous formation of certain 
critical nodes in the supply chain, it will be beneficial for all participants in the supply 
chain to transform it to a horizontal one. That is, certain incentives should be given to 
physically disperse across East Asia the production of such products that are 
concentrated in the hands of a few suppliers. In this regard, Japan’s acceptance of 
inward direct investment remains at a remarkably low level. To rebound, it must 
positively accept it, particularly in the countryside manufacturing regions, which could 
significantly benefit from investment from East Asian companies trying to realize 
advanced technological innovation by taking advantage of the brand attraction of 
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Figure 1 Evolution of East Asian exports by markets and categories 
 
Note. (A) East Asia, (W) rest of the world 




Figure 2 GDP shares of the EU, NAFTA, and East Asia 
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NAFTA Three economies total 17 
 
Figure 3 Two types of regional integration in East Asia 
    




Figure 4 Intra-regional trade shares of East Asia, the EU, and NAFTA   
  
East Asia consists of ASEAN-10 plus China, Japan, Korea, Hong Kong, and Taiwan.   
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Year-on-year % change 
 
(Source) Japan Automobile Manufacturing Association, Statistics Bureau of Guangdong 

















Jan‐11 Feb‐11 Mar‐11 Apr‐11 May‐11 Jun‐11 Jul‐11 Aug‐11
Japan Guangdong‐China Thailand
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Actual -57.3  20 
 







Buses 41.9  0.0017 
Passenger cars  37.4  0.0855 
Household electronic machinery  32.4  0.0129 
Communication equipment  30.5  0.0150 
Other information and communication electronics 
equipment  29.6 0.0030 
Motor vehicle parts  27.4  0.0457 
Trucks 24.2  0.0173 
Integrated circuits  21.5  0.0316 
Metal products of building  21.1  0.0087 
Non-ferrous metal castings  20.7  0.0055 
Chemical machinery  19.0  0.0012 
Industrial inorganic chemicals, pigment and catalyst  17.6  0.0033 
Processed vegetable and fruit products  16.7  0.0028 
Refining of non-ferrous metals  16.2  0.0056 
*Comparison of the second quarter.    **Manufacturing total = 1 
(Source) METI, Indices of Industrial Production Statistics Report 